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PENNSYLVANIA'S FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY
STATUTE-CORRUPTION OF BLOOD AND
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Pennsylvania Public Assistance Act,1 the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Public Welfare is required to grant assistance
to those persons within the state who are without sufficient re-
sources to maintain themselves.2 The Pennsylvania Support Act,3
designed to mesh with the above provision,4 provides in part that:
The husband, wife, child, (except as hereinafter pro-
vided), father and mother of every indigent person,
whether a public charge or not, shall, if of sufficient finan-
cial ability, care for and maintain, or financially assist, such
indigent person at such rate as the court of the county,
where such indigent person resides shall order or direct
5
Thus, each member of this statutorily delineated class6 is consid-
ered by the Department of Public Assistance as "a potential re-
source to persons applying for or receiving assistance,"' and it is
mandatory that an "assistance client explore and develop the re-
source that this LRR may represent to him." If the LRR proves
unwilling to voluntarily provide such care and maintenance for his
indigent kinsman, statutory enforcement procedures are provided.9
Upon petition by the indigent person, or by any other person
or public body or agency with an interest in the case, the courts
of the Commonwealth are empowered to "hear, determine and
make orders and decrees"'10 that the amount determined as pos-
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 401-1501 (1967).
2. An indigent person is one who does not have sufficient means to
pay for his care and maintenance himself, and is not necessarily one who
is completely destitute and helpless. Commonwealth ex tel. Home for the
Jewish Aged v. Kotzker, 179 Pa. Super. 521, 118 A.2d 271 (1955).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1963).
4. Pennsylvania Welfare Manual § 3237 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PA. WEL. MAN.].
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1963).
6. The persons named by the statute as being legally responsible are
generally known as Legally Responsible Relatives [hereinafter referred to
as LRRs].
7. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3237 (1969).
8. Id.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (b), (c) (1963).
10. Id. at (b).
sible" and necessary .2 for the support of the indigent shall be
made available" to the indigent by whichever member of the listed
class is being sued.
1 4
Provision for enforcement of the court's order is also estab-
lished by statute. Upon filing of a petition stating that the order
has not been complied with, the court must issue an attachment
directing the recalcitrant LRR to appear. 15 A hearing is held to
determine whether the noncompliance is willful.' 6 Following a
finding of willful noncompliance, the LRR may be found in con-
tempt and sentenced to the county jail for a period of up to six
months. In addition, the support order is a debt of record, the or-
der being in the nature of a regular judgment 1 7 thus making avail-
able all of the normal civil actions for enforcement. 8
No statutory guidelines have been provided for the determi-
nation of either the amount of each LRR's liability or the order in
which the LRR's will be responsible for payment. Further, a more
remote relative may be held liable without proof of exhaustion of
remedies against a closer relative. 19 Although final determination
of the LRR's monetary responsibility is in the courts, the decision
in practice devolves to the Department of Public Welfare.20 The
DPW determines the LRR's expected contribution by means of
subtracting the "Minimum Requirements for an Adequate Stand-
ard of Living"21 for the LRR's family from his gross monthly in-
come. The remainder is then divided by the total number in the
LRR's family, plus one, resulting in the expected contribution.
22
11. See note 22 and accompanying text infra.
12. The amount of support necessary is determined by the "Minimum
Requirements for an Adequate Standard of Living" established by City
Worker's Budget, a study conducted by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The figure is increased if extraordinary expenses such as medical
or hospital costs are shown.
13. The LRR's payments are either made directly to the court making
the support order, or to the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare [herein-
after referred to as DPW), who then pay the indigent.
14. This class of LRRs, although including spouses, will hereinafter
be referred to as either consanguinal or blood relatives.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973(c) (1963). An attachment is a pro-
cedural method, based upon a contempt charge, for bringing the LRR be-
fore the court. Commonwealth v. Horwitz, 78 Pa. Super. 383 (1922).
16. Id.
17. Henry's Estate, 28 Pa. Super. 541 (1905).
18. Id.
19. In re Stoner's Estate, 50 Lanc. L.R. 347 (Pa. C.P. 1946), aff'd, 358
Pa. 252, 56 A.2d 250 (1947).
20. See, e.g., PA. WEL. MAN. § 3237 and appendix (1969).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. For example, an LRR with a gross monthly income of $500.00, with
four dependents including himself, subtracts $455.00, the Minimum Re-
quirement for an Adequate Standard of Living. The resulting $45.00 figure
is the amount available for expenses above minimum requirements. This
figure is then divided by five (the number in the LRR's family plus one),
giving $9.00 per month as the expected contribution. This figure can be
waived or decreased by administrative action of DPW, although no formal
guidelines have been established by them.
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The indigent is then expected to make arrangements with the LRR
for this payment,23 and if secured, that amount is considered as
income available to the indigent, thereby reducing his allotment
from DPW.24 If the LRR refuses to make the determined contri-
bution, the indigent is urged to bring an action against him; 25 fail-
ing this, an action may be brought by the DPW.26 The DPW's find-
ing as to availability of resources is submitted to the court at the
determination of liability hearing, and is generally followed.
27
Thus, in Pennsylvania every adult citizen of sufficient means
is required by statute to provide care and maintenance for his in-
digent relatives. This Comment will analyze the constitutionality
of the Pennsylvania statute in light of the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution and the uniformity of taxation clause
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Although the conclusions
reached by this Comment are the result of an analysis of the Penn-
sylvania family responsibility statute, the conclusions reached and
the discussion on which they rest are equally applicable to the fam-
ily responsibility statutes of other states.
28
23. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3237, at 29 (1969). Previously, if the LRR re-
fused, the indigent was required to institute action against him as a con-
dition of eligibility. This requirement was ruled unconstitutional in Woods
v. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
24. PA. WEL. MAN. § 3237, at 19 (1969).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See PA. WEL. MAN. § 3237 (1969).
28. See ALA. CODE tit. 44, § 8 (1940); ALAsKA STAT. 25.20.030 (1962);
ARIz. REv. STAT., § 46-236 (1952); ARK. STAT. ANN., § 83-607 (Supp. 1953)
(repealed ARK. STAT. ANN., § 83-607 (1955)); CAL. CIrv. CODE, § 206 (West
1971); CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE, § 17300 (West 1965); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN., § 36-10-70; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 17-320; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 501 (1953); GA. CODE ANN., § 23-2302 (1936); HAWAII REv. LAws, § 31-577-
5 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN., § 32-1002 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 23, § 10-1;
IND. ANN. STAT., § 3-3001 (1955); IOWA CODE ANN., § 252.1 (1949); LA. REV.
STAT., § 13.4731 (1950); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (West 1970); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3452 (1963); MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 117, § 6 (1949);
MICH. STAT. ANN., § 16.121 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN., § 261.01 (1947); Miss.
CODE ANN., § 7357 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT., § 208.010 (1952); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN., § 71-233 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT., § 68-101 (Supp. 1953); NEV.
REV. STAT., § 428.070 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 167.2 (1964); N.J. REV.
STAT., § 44:1-139 (1940); N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, § 101 (Supp. 1955);
N.Y. CRIMINAL CODE, § 914 (1945); N.Y. CITY DoMEsTIc RELATIONS COURT
ACT, §§ 92,101; N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-09-10, § 50-01-19 (1958); Omo REV.
CODE ANN., § 2901.40 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 11, 12 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT., § 109.010, § 411.410 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1971
et seq. (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN., § 15-11-7 (1936); S.C. CODE ANN.,
§ 71-131 (1952); S.D. CODE, § 25-7-27 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN., § 17-14-1
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 931 (1953); VA. CODE ANN., § 20-88 (1954);
W. VA. CODE ANN., § 626(150) (1949); WiS. STAT., § 52.01 (1963). Family
responsibility statutes do not appear to exist in Florida, Kansas, Kentucky,
II. THE CONCEPTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Neither the above described techniques of implementation nor
the concept that an individual is responsible for the support and
maintenance of another individual solely because of the happen-
stance of consanguinity are unique to Pennsylvania. There are
presently similar family responsibility laws in at least thirty-two
other states.2 9 Nor is the concept itself new; the concept and
various implementing statutes date from the sixteenth century.
0
Shortly after the first English blood responsibility law, the
concept of family responsibility became statutorily linked with the
public relief of the poor:
And be it further enacted, That the father and the
grandfather, the mother and grandmother, and the children
of every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person, or
other poor person not able to work, being of a sufficient
ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and maintain
every such poor person .... 1
Although the humane intent of the act appears to be clear on its
face, the Elizabethean rationale went beyond humane considera-
tions. Poverty, it was reasoned, was a labor problem, one of put-
ting unemployed manpower to productive use, either in jobs of
their own selection or in houses of correction or other projects un-
der an "overseer of the poor. 3 2 In such manner, the unemployed
could provide for their own support.8 3 Physically handicapped
poor were a burden which the laboring class having created, was
required to support.3 4 Of course, the incidental side effect of
forced acceptance of this social burden by the laboring class was
to relieve the landed class of a major financial drain.3 5 Placing
this responsibility, where possible, on the limited class of blood rel-
atives was an appropriate further step in laying the burden of the
indigent more precisely where it supposedly belonged-on the
New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wyoming.
Arkansas repealed its family responsibility law in its entirety in 1955.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-607 (1955).
29. Id.
30. 18 ELIz. 1, ch. 3 (1575). The act provided for the support of ille-
gitimate children by their parents. The act lists as its purpose the reduction
of costs of poor relief to the parishes.
31. 43 ELiz. 1, ch. 2, § 7 (1601). Passed as part of the original ELIZA-
BETHEAN POOR LAW, the section was based on an even earlier provision
virtually identical in context. 39 Eliz. 1, ch. 3 (1597).
32. ORDINANCE AND STATUTE OF LABORERS, 23 EDW. 3, ch. I-VII C (1349).
See Ten Broeck, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, De-
velopment, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. RrV. 257, 276-86 (1964). [Mr.
Ten Broeck's article was published in two parts, the first in 1964 and the
second in 1965, Ten Broeck, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965). For
clarity, the first will hereinafter be cited as Ten Broeck I and the second
as Ten Broeck III.
33. Ten Broeck I, supra note 32, at 278.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 258-91.
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broad backs of the laborers who either brought the indigent into
the world or were the products of the indigent's presence there.
3 6
Remnants of this rationale have been carried over into American
legislative policies and judicial interpretations: it is widely rec-
ognized by modern courts that the primary purpose of the family
responsibility statutes is to protect the public purse.3 7
III. PENNSYLVANIA ANTECEDENTS
Pennsylvania adopted the concept of responsibility based on
consanguinity in one of its first poor laws,3 8 That act, ratified in
1771, contained a provision substantially identical to Pennsylvania's
current family responsibility statute:
And be it further enacted, that the father and grand-
father, and the mother and grandmother, and the children
of every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person, or
other poor person not able to work, being of sufficient abil-
ity, shall at their own charge relieve and maintain every
such poor person, as the Magistrates or the Justices of the
Peace, at their next General Quarter Sessions for the city
or county where such poor persons reside, shall order and
direct, on pain of forfeiting forty shillings for every month
they shall fail therein.89
Only minor changes have been made in the provision during the
past 200 years.
4 0
While the statutory language remained unchanged, however,
society underwent vast changes. Public acceptance of the family
responsibility statutes was without incident in the eighteenth and
36. Id.
37. E.g., People v. Hill, 163 IlM, 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); Ketcham v.
Ketcham, 176 Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1941).
38. Act of March 9, 1771, No. 635, 1 Smith L. 332 [1771] Pa. Laws 507
(repealed 1937).
39. Id.
40. In 1945, grandparents were excluded by statutory amendment. Act
of May 23, 1945, No. 352, § 1 [1945] Pa. Laws 864 (repealed ). The
lengthy description of persons to be supported was changed in 1937 to the
word "indigent." Act of June 24, 1937, No. 396, § 3 [19371 Pa. Laws 2045
(repealed ). That term in turn was qualified by the phrase "whether a
public charge or not" by another 1945 amendment. Act of May 23, 1945,
No. 353, § 1 [1945] Pa. Laws 865 (repealed ). And of course, as the
state's judicial system became more structured, other courts were substi-
tuted for magistrates and justices of the peace. Act of March 29, 1803, No.
2368, § 29, 4 Smith L. 50 [1803] Pa. Laws 507 (repealed 1941); Act of June
24, 1937, No. 396 [1937] Pa. Laws 2045 (repealed ). In 1771 monetary
sanction was replaced by a penal sanction, and provision was made for
reduction in obligation under certain circumstances. Act of June 24, 1937,
No. 396 [1937] Pa. Laws 2045 (repealed ).
nineteenth centuries.41 The family unit was still the central ele-
ment in a largely agrarian economy, so that indigent family mem-
bers were readily incorporated into the family economic unit.
42
But as time passed, society's emphasis on the family unit began to
weaken, a phenomenon which paralleled the state and national
transition into an urban industrial society.43 In the new society the
old, sick, and infirm were no longer of any use to the family eco-
nomic unit. Periodic industrial recessions caused simultaneous
lowering of the employment rate, thereby increasing the number
of able bodied indigents.4 4 Concurrently, increasing reluctance to
comply with the family responsibility laws became evident as re-
flected in increasing litigation.
The Pennsylvania statute was first attacked in 1847 when the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, where the father of poor
and destitute children is outside the jurisdiction of the court, a
grandfather will be held liable.4 5  This holding was followed by
a flurry of activity contesting the liability of grandparents for
support of indigent relatives, and in every instance the grandpar-
ents were held liable.4" In 1876, children began judicially con-
testing their liability for support of indigent parents.47 Again,
more activity followed, increasing in frequency during the twenti-
eth century, and again in every instance, the basic liability for sup-
port was upheld.
4"
In 1885, the meaning of sufficient financial ability was ques-
tioned,49 followed in 1889 by judicial resolution of a dispute regard-
ing the meaning of indigency. ° During the nineteenth century,
no attacks were made on the constitutionality of the statutes, but
in 1916 two related attacks were made. In Mansley's Estate,5' it
41. P. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY, 51-68
(1917).
42. J. SCHARR, FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY,
U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., SOCIAL S cuRrrY DIvISION OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, 1-4
(1960) [hereinafter cited as ScHAR].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Guardians of the Poor of Philadelphia v. Smith, 4 Clark 60 (Pa.
1847).
46. See, e.g., Duffey v. Duffey, 44 Pa. 399 (1863); Appeal of Seibert,
19 Pa. 49 (1852); In re Hadsall, 13 Luz. L.R. 237 (Pa. C.P. 1884); Applica-
tion of Whiting, 16 Pitts. L.J. 272 (Pa. C.P. 1869).
47. Reserve Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kaul, 81 Pa. 154 (1876).
48. Appeal of Werner, 91 Pa. 222 (1879); Poor Directors v. Schultz,
2 Lanc. R. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1882). As to twentieth century activity, see, e.g.,
Commonwealth ex rel. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 193 Pa. Super. 161, 163 A.2d 923
(1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Price v. Campbell, 180 Pa. Super. 518, 119
A.2d 816 (1956); Commonwealth v. Ruckle, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 51 (C.P. Columb.
1955); Commonwealth v. Chiara, 60 Pa. D. & C. 547 (C.P.Perry 1947); In re
Bauer, 29 Pa. D. & C. 372 (C.P. Montg. 1937); Commonwealth v. Gross, 35
York 93 (Pa. C.P. 1921); Commonwealth v. Redman, 18 York 163 (Pa. C.P.
1905).
49. Moore v. Marsh, 16 Weekly Notes of Cases 239 (Pa. 1885).
50. Luzerne County Cent. Poor Dist. v. Hirner, 5 Kulp 265 (Pa. 1889).
51. 253 Pa. 527, 98 A. 702 (1916). Article III, Section 7 of the Pennsyl-
Comments
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was argued that a statute requiring financial maintenance by rela-
tives of insane persons in a state institution was unconstitutional
as local or special legislation. The court held the statute valid, be-
cause the act applied equally to the entire state, not being limited
to any locality. 52 In re Duerr5 3 involved an attack on a similar stat-
ute. The defendant postulated that the statute deprived him of
the right of trial by jury as the support judgment was authorized
to be by court order; the court held this procedure to be a valid
exercise of legislative power.54 Subsequent constitutional attacks
in Pennsylvania have met with a similar lack of success. 5
While these early attacks on Pennsylvania's family support
statutes were being launched and defeated, other states, having
adopted similar legislation,56 were experiencing similar litigation,
with similar results.5 7  In no instance did an attack on family re-
vania Constitution provides:
No local or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the
intention to apply therefor shall have been published in the locality
where the matter or the thing to be effected may be situated, which
notice shall be at least thirty days prior to the introduction into
the General Assembly of such bill and in the manner to be pro-
vided by law; the evidence of such notice having been published,
shall be exhibited in the General Assembly, before such bill shall
be passed.
52. Id. at 524, 98 A. at 703.
53. 25 Pa. Dist. 406 (1916).
54. Id. at 409.
55. Cf. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Assist. v. Allison, 19 Cambria 117
(Pa. C.P. 1959), holding the current statutes [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973
(1963)] not to violate any section of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
56. See note 28 supra.
57. In 1922 a Kansas statute imposing liability for the support and
maintenance of insane kindred in state asylums on named relatives was
challenged as violative of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not
constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law. State v.
Bateman, 110 Kan. 546, 204 P. 682 (1922). In 1900 and 1901, South Dakota
and California, faced with a statute similar to that upheld in Mansley's
Estate, concurred with Pennsylvania in finding that their respective stat-
utes did not constitute special legislation. Bon Homme County v. Berndt,
13 S.D. 309, 83 N.W. 333 (1900); In re Yturburru, 134 Cal. 567, 66 P. 729
(1901). A California court in 1908 considered the contention that requiring
an LRR to support an individual personally, where the LRR was also re-
quired to pay general taxes devoted to the same purpose, constituted double
taxation. That court turned to public policy reasons in refuting the conten-
tion:
If such a proposition could be maintained, there would be nothing
to interfere with the filling of the county hospitals and alms-
houses with persons well able to pay for their own care, who would
thus, without cost to themselves, be maintained at public expense,-
at the expense of many other taxpayers having no interest in such
institutions.. . . State Comm. in Lunacy v. Eldridge, 7 Cal. App.
298, 299, 94 P. 597, 600 (1908).
The double taxation argument was also raised in South Dakota on the
second appeal of Bon Homme County v. Berndt, 15 S.D. 494, 90 N.W. 147
sponsibility statutes receive judicial acceptance until 1964 when tie
California Supreme Court considered Department of Mental Hy-
giene v. Kirchner."
IV. FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner
In 1964, the California Supreme Court in Kirchner, held uncon-
stitutional a California statute which made certain named relatives
financially responsible for expenses incident to the maintenance of
the insane in state hospitals. 59 Application of the statute, reasoned
the court, would constitute the imposition of a species of taxation
on a class of citizens-the relatives of insane persons-selected in
a manner that had no rational basis. 60 That court held that such
a statute "obviously violates the equal protection clause."1
61
The Kirchner rationale was threefold: (1) The enactment and
administration of laws providing for treatment of persons in state
institutions is "a proper state function. '62 (2) The cost of such
a proper state function conducted for the benefit of the entire pub-
lic "cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; ...
such assessment violates the equal protection clause." 63  (3) In or-
der for the selection of a particular class for the imposition of such
charges to avoid being arbitrary, it must be rationally selected;
here "no rational basis supports such classification." 64 Employing
consanguinity as "a concept for the state's taking of a free man's
property manifestly denies him equal protection of the law."65
(1902). The South Dakota Supreme Court held the contention "more spe-
cious than real," reasoning that payment to the state by an LRR was
merely a return of tax money borrowed by the LRR for support of his
indigent relative.
58. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 (1964).
59. CAL. WELF. INST'NS CODE § 6650 (West 1952).
60. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716-18, 36
Cal. Rptr. 488, 490-91, 388 P.2d 720, 724 (1964). The case was appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which remanded for determination of
whether the decision rested on the federal or California equal protection
clause. The California court subsequently attributed its holding to the
state clause:
It has been and is our understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution, and sections 11 and 21
of the California Constitution, provide generally equivalent but
independent protections in their respective jurisdictions.
62 Cal. 2d 586, 587, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330, 400 P.2d 321, 322 (1965).
61. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 718,
36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 490, 388 P.2d 720, 723 (1964). And see Ten Broeck, Cali-
fornia's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614, 639 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Ten Broeck
II].
62. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 719-20, 36
Cal. Rptr. 490, 388 P.2d 722 (1964).
63. Id. at 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490, 388 P.2d at 722.




Justice Schauer's opinion in this case gave clear indication that
defendant's federal right to equal protection of the laws was being
denied. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which vacated and remanded for a determination of whether
the California court had based its decision on federal or state
grounds.66 In a brief opinion,6 7 the California Supreme Court
stated that it had relied on the California constitution's equal pro-
tection clause, noting however that it considered the implications
of the federal and state provisions to be equivalent.6 8
Following the California Supreme Court's limitation, that
state's lower courts immediately commenced construing Kirchner
as narrowly as possible.69 Kirchner's reasoning has since been
found applicable only in the rare instance when the peculiar facts
of Kirchner were present: (1) that the LRR would not otherwise
be liable for the support of the incompetent, but for the mental
health statute; (2) that initiation of commitment proceedings must
have been by the state, and not the LRR, and (3) that the commit-
ment must be primarily for public protection rather than for the
rehabilitation of the incompetent.70 In narrowly interpreting
Kirchner, these courts completely eliminated the LRR from the
group of persons protected by Kirchner, for California has a statute
similar to Pennsylvania's family responsibility statute making
named relatives of indigents "otherwise . . . liable." Such a con-
66. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
67. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321 (1965).
68. The California Constitution, article I, section 11, requires that "All
laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." Section 21 of
the same article specifies that:
[N]o special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which
may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor
shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or im-
munities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all
citizens.
Construing these sections of their Constitution, the California Supreme
Court stated:
These provisions of our state constitution have been generally
thought in California to be substantially equivalent of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 587, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 330, 400 P.2d 321, 322 (1965).
69. See Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal. App. 2d 12,
54 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1968); Estate of Preston, 243 Cal. App. 2d 803, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1966); Alameda v. Espinosa, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1966); In re Dudley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966);
Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1965); Dept.
of Mental Hygiene v. Schumpert, 228 Cal. App. 2d 698, 39 Cal. Rptr. 698
(1964).
70. Id.
struction, as discussed below, is contrary to the clear meaning of
the decision."
Underlying the entire rationale of the Kirchner decision is a
concept referred to by that court as the "parens patriae princi-
ple."72 Traditionally, this concept was considered to stem from the
sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability,
such as minors, incompetents, and the insane. Kirchner however
places a different meaning on this traditional concept-that the
state has assumed a duty to help the needy citizen, a duty which
creates a relationship more direct as to the matter of support than
the relationship between the incompetent and his LRR's. "[F]or-
mer concepts which have been suggested to uphold the imposition
of support liability upon a person selected by an administrative
agent from classes of relatives designated by the Legislature may
well be re-examined. '73 The state legislature, in short, has been
held to have decided that, for the good of all of the people, they
must care for and maintain that part of the populace which is un-
able to maintain and care for itself. This assumed responsibility
is administered through "divers . .. public welfare programs to
which all citizens are contributing through presumptively duly ap-
portioned taxes. ' 74 It is the parens patriae principle which Kirch-
ner views as rendering not rational the selection of named relatives
as the class responsible for the cost of caring for mental incompe-
tents;75 the state as a whole, rather than statutorily named LRR's,
should bear the responsibility for persons suffering from a disabil-
ity. The Kirchner rationale would, however, appear to possess a
broader base than mere judicial recognition that the term "parens
patriae" has been redefined by sociological change. Further justi-
fication for the parens patriae concept, and simultaneously, a logi-
cal basis for recognizing its inclusion of all indigents can be found
in the legislative language used in the California law.
The California Legislature declared its purpose in enacting its
Welfare Code to be:
t . . to provide for the protection, care and assistance
to the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote
the welfare and happiness of all of the people of the state
by providing appropriate public assistance and services to
all of its needy and distressed. 6
It would be difficult indeed for the California Legislature to
have more clearly expressed its intent to assume responsibility for
the state's indigents and thereby benefit its entire populace. The
71. Cf. Ten Broeck II, supra note 61, at 638-39.
72. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d at 720-21,




76. CAL. WELF. INST'NS CODE § 19 (West 1952) [emphasis supplied].
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
clear intent is to serve and protect the interests of the general pub-
lic, the well-being of the entire populace and the "welfare and hap-
piness of all of the people." Kirchner's acceptance of this and
other statements of legislative intent 77 provides a solid basis for its
recognition of the modified parens partiae concept.
Once the validity of the parens patriae concept is accepted, the
court's rationale falls easily into place: (1) Parens patriae imposes
a duty upon the state as a whole to care for its physically, men-
tally, emotionally and financially handicapped citizens. (2) Ex-
press legislative intent reinforces this duty. (3) The judicially
recognized and legislatively explicit purpose of assuming such a
duty is to promote the welfare and happiness of all of the people
of the state. (4) Being in the interest of all the people of the state,
the expenses incurred in fulfilling this responsibility falls properly
on all of the people of the state. (5) Selection of a particular class
from all of the people of the state to bear these expenses necessar-
ily violates the equal protection clause.
In this light, the lower California court's limitation of the deci-
sion shows itself to be artificial. It would appear to fly in the face
of logic to recognize a state duty to support mental incompetents
committed for public protection to state institutions by state ac-
tion on the one hand, and simultaneously deny the existence of
such a duty where, for example, commitment proceedings have
been instituted by concerned relatives,7 8 on the other. Nor is the
above discussed broad language of the Kirchner court indicative
of such an intent.
Kirchner's recognition of parens patriae, it is submitted, is no
more than a proper judicial recognition of stated legislative policy:
promotion of the welfare of all of the people through state care
and maintenance of its mentally and financially deprived citizens.
And where the care of indigents is accepted as the responsibility
of the various governments, raising money through taxes and ap-
plying it to that end is certainly "a proper state function. '7 9
B. Federal Constitutional Requisites to Permissible Discrimina-
tory Classification
Assuming the theoretical soundness of the Kirchner rationale,
77. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. INST'NS. CODE, § 6655 (West 1952), discussed
by the court in Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 720-21, 36 Cal. Rptr. 491, 388 P.2d
723-24 (1964).
78. See, note 69 supra.
79. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 719-20, 36
Cal. Rptr. 490, 388 P.2d 722 (1964).
the constitutional validity of Pennsylvania's family responsibility
statute must be reexamined. Where a state chooses to finance the
exercise of a proper state function by placing the financial burden
of such a function on one class of citizens, and not on others, its
selection of the class to be charged must satisfy certain constitu-
tional principles announced by the United States Supreme Court,
or be found to violate the federal equal protection clause. Two dis-
tinct tests have evolved for making this determination. The first
of these is the "compelling interest" test, employed where the
rights affected are considered fundamental and constitutionally
based.80 Where such rights are found, the state must show a com-
pelling interest and need for the statute being challenged.81 In
applying the compelling interest test, the court inquiry is whether
the state interests advanced by the classification are sufficient to
outweigh the injury done to the individual or class of individuals
by the unequal treatment to which he or it is subjected.8 2 The
courts tend to review the classification carefully and demand a
convincing demonstration that the discrimination bears "a definite
and close relationship" to the statutory objective.
88
Although the rights involved in family responsibility statutes
may be fundamental, they do not appear to be constitutionally
based. Where such non-constitutionally based rights are involved,
the second or "rational basis" test is employed. Under this test, the
reasonableness or wisdom of the state's discriminatory classifica-
tion scheme is not closely scrutinized, rather, if a rationally sup-
portable reason for the regulation is found, the scheme is deemed
sufficient.8 4 It is not enough that the measure results incidentally
in some inequality, or that it is not drawn with mathematical
nicety.8 5 The identity of treatment,
only requires that classification rest on real and not feigned
differences, that the distinction have some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made, and that the
80. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (rights of ille-
gitimates); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry and right
against discrimination based on race); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) (right to travel); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (right to
vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
81. Mr. Justice Harlan describes this test in his dissenting opinion in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
82. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). For a
discussion of the balancing of these interests see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457, 465 (1965); Note, 84 HARv. L. REV. 612 (1970).
83. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); 82 HAaV. L.
REv. 1065, 1122 (1969). Note however that a possibility of some rationality
may be enough for courts to uphold the classification; e.g., Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 631 (1969).
84. Morey v. Doud, 34 U.S. 457 (1951); Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911).
85. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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different treatments be not so disparate, relative to the dif-
ference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary.86
A two part formulation of this test has evolved: (1) the classifi-
cation must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the
statute, 7 and (2) the classification must include and similarly treat
all citizens who are similarly situated.""
Pennsylvania's family responsibility statute places the finan-
cial burden of care and maintenance of Pennsylvania indigents
upon a class of citizens selected from the general populace only by
its members' blood or marital kinship to the indigent. For that
statute to meet the test of constitutionality, (1) the class selected
must be reasonably related to the stated legislative purpose for en-
acting the Public Assistance Act, and (2) the financial burden
must be placed equally on all persons standing in a similar rela-
tionship to the indigent. Both parts of this test must be fulfilled
in order for the classification to be constitutionally acceptable.
1. Does the Class Selected by the Pennsylvania Statute for
Imposition of the Financial Burden of Support Bear a Reasonable
Relationship to the Purpose of the Statute?
The Pennsylvania Legislature declared its intent in enacting
the Pennsylvania Assistance Act to be:
[T] o promote the welfare and happiness of all of the People
of the Commonwealth, by providing public assistance to all
of its needy and distressed; ... administered in such a way
and manner as to encourage. the desire to be a good citi-
zen and useful to society.89
An additional, judicially recognized purpose of family responsibil-
ity statutes generally is to protect the public purse.90
The legislative statement of purpose evidences an intent to con-
fer upon the general population a "benefit"-the promotion of the
health and welfare of all of the people by aiding the state's needy
and distressed citizens in such a manner as to make them better
citizens and useful to society. This benefit is one intended to be
shared equally by all members of the state's populace.
86. Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
87. Gulf, Col. Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Ten Broeck
II, supra note 61, at 640.
88. Ten Broeck II, supra note 61 at 640; Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S.
231 (1954); cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1956); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 375 (1954).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 401 (1967).
90. See, e.g., Ketcham v. Ketcham, 176 Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S.2d 773
(1941); People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896).
Certainly, if it could be found that one of the purposes of the
statute was to confer a special benefit upon the blood relatives, a
reasonable relationship could be established for their selection to
bear the cost of indigent support. There is undoubtedly some ben-
efit intended to this class of citizens: their health and welfare, of
course, also will be promoted through expanded societal usefulness
of the indigent. But the benefit is not demonstrably larger than
that intended for the populace as a whole.9 1 It cannot be shown
that a special benefit is realized by the class,9 2 nor, indeed, has the
Legislature stated an intent to specially benefit the LRR.9 3 This
class is subjected to general taxation from which is derived the
monies employed to ease the plight of the indigent; 94 thus, their
"share" of the intended benefit is financed in the same manner and
to the same extent as the remainder of the general populace. All
taxpayers pay for the benefit received through their normal tax
contributions; LRR's, as part of the general populace, contribute
in the same manner and to the same degree as the remainder of
the taxpaying populace. Thus, since no special benefits accrue, the
statute provides no reasonable basis for separate classification of
legally responsible relatives.
Consanguinity itself, often cited as a moral basis for family
responsibility statutes, 95 offers no rational basis for the classifica-
tion.9 6 Governmental support of indigent citizens provides no dis-
cernible special benefit-either direct or indirect-to the blood rel-
atives: their benefit is identical to that of the remainder of the
general public-happiness and well-being inspired by increased so-
cietal usefulness of the indigent.
Operation of the Public Assistance Act resulting in aid being
given to an indigent individual may at first blush appear to confer
upon that indigent's blood relative a "special benefit" by relieving
him of the need to support his kinsman. Closer inspection, how-
ever, reveals this "special benefit" to be one not of purpose9 7 but of
happenstance, and in this the relatives are in no different position
than the mother of a potential victim of rape saved by a policeman
paid from the public treasury, or the father of an individual whose
house or business is saved from flames by publicly funded fire-
91. Cf. Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?,
1 FAM. L.Q. 55, 75 (1967); Ten Broeck II, supra note 61, at 641.
92. See note 91 supra.
93. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 401 (1967).
94. This situation clearly points to the question of double taxation:
see note 57 supra.
95. E.g., 1 BLAcnsTONs, COMMENTAIES 448. The act of begetting im-
plies a voluntary assumption of liability for all who "descend from his
loins."
96. See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
97. There is evident no legislative intent to confer such a "benefit."
Such a result is simply not contemplated by the Public Assistance Act as
being a relevant factor.
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men. Few would assert that these "special benefit" recipients
should be held financially responsible for the salary of the police-
man, or the fair market value of the services rendered by the fire-
men and their equipment. Yet the parallel appears to be exact.9 8
In final analysis, what the family responsibility statutes are
doing is visiting the sins of the father on his children, or those of
the children on their parents; the concept may be justifiable Bib-
lically,99 but certainly not legally. 100
It has frequently been argued that a prime justification behind
a family responsibility statute is that by placing the financial re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of indigents on relatives the pub-
lic purse is protected. 1 ' Such an argument has never been recog-
nized legislatively but is rooted in a type of logical expediency.
As discussed above, in order to protect the public purse, the Penn-
sylvania support statute-like all other family responsibility stat-
utes-creates a class of persons consisting of named consanguinal
relative of indigent persons. 10 2 The selection of one class of per-
sons from the general populace, for whatever purpose, is by defi-
nition discriminatory. However, discrimination, despite its com-
mon connotation, is in many instances permissible, and frequently
occurs. The United States Supreme Court has held that discrimi-
nation may be acceptable if the interest to be promoted thereby is
constitutionally permissible.1 03 Although never delineating a list
of what interests are constitutionally permissible, the Court has
mentioned some that are not:
We recognize that a state has a valid interest in pre-
serving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legiti-
98. Cf. Ten Broeck II, supra note 61.
99. DEUTERONOmY 5, 6 "[F]or I the Lord thy God am a jealous God,
visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and
fourth generation. . . ." Cf. EXODUS 20, 5; 34, 7.
100. The philosophers of Elizabeth I's England had another theory simi-
lar to their blood-responsibility concept whereby the sins of a parent were
visited on his child and those of the child on the parent-this second theory
and practice was that if an individual were to commit treason, his blood
became "attainted." On the basis of this attainting, blood and marital rela-
tives were divested of property, status, and privilege. This concept of
corruption of blood was so abhorred by the Founding Fathers that they
were moved to specifically forbid it. See CoNsTTOTuoN OF PENNSYLVANIA,
art. I, §§ 18 and 19, and UNiTED STATES CONsnTUTiON, art. III, § 3. Those
prohibitive constitutional mandates as to treason are no less applicable
where the concept is applied to the infinitely lesser stigma of being indigent.
The message is clear: The Legislature shall not work corruption of blood.
To do so is to discriminate.
101. See note 36 supra.
102. See notes 1-28 and accompanying text supra.
103. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
mately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for pub-
lic assistance, public education, or any other program. But
a state may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious dis-
tinctions between its citizens .... The saving of welfare
costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.
04
In other words, the mere fact that a state can save money by plac-
ing the primary financial burden for maintaining indigents on the
indigent's blood relatives does not provide a constitutionally per-
missible rational basis for such a practice.
There fore, the final determination of whether family responsi-
bility statutes in general, and Pennsylvania's statute in particular
bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statute-pro-
motion of the health and welfare of all of the people through the
increased usefulness of the indigent-depends on the presence or
absence of a reasonable relationship between the statutorily stated
purpose of benefiting the entire populace and the assignment of
the expense of this benefit to the class of LRR's. As discussed
above, such a reasonable relationship cannot be shown. It is sub-
mitted that, on this basis, Pennsylvania's family responsibility stat-
ute is unconstitutional.
2. Is, the Financial Burden of Support of the Indigent Placed
Equally on All Persons Standing in a Similar Relationship to the
Indigent?
Both aspects of the test established by the United States Su-
preme Court must be met in order for a questioned classification
to be constitutionally acceptable. As discussed, the classification
falls to satisfy the first requirement of the test, that of having a
reasonable relationship to the statutory purpose. On this basis
alone, the classification, and thus the statute, is unconstitutional.
However, the constitutional weakness of the classification is fur-
ther demonstrated through consideration of its failure to meet the
second requirement.
To pass the second portion of the test, the classification of
blood relatives as a separate source of monies must be shown to in-
clude all who are similarly situated in relationship to the indigent.
Initially, once a determination of need on the part of the indigent
and ability to contribute on the part of an LRR has been made,
the statutes do not look to the LRR's as a group for contribution.105
In Pennsylvania, for instance, the named relatives are in practice
liable severally. 08 Thus, in a situation where there exist several
104. Id. at 633-34. See also Sailer v. Leger, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
105. In re Stoner's Estate, 50 Lanc. R. 347 (Pa. C.P. 1947), aff'd, 358
Pa. 252, 56 A.2d 250 (1947).
106. In re Stoner's Estate, 50 Lanc. R. 347 (Pa. C.P. 1947), affd, 358




persons within the statutorily delineated class of LRR's, one may
be chosen to assume the full support responsibility. There is not
even a designation of the order in which the named LRR's are
liable,10 7 so that a more distant relative may be compelled to pay
even though a closer relative with ability to contribute is avail-
able.108 In theory, all of the named relatives are included within
the class and thus can be made to contribute; in practice, all but
one may be excluded from honoring this statutory duty.
There are further instances of inequities in application of the
statute. Although Pennsylvania includes children within its class
of LRR's,'0 9 illegitimate children"0 and children who have been
abandoned for a period of ten years during their minority are re-
lieved of the support duty."" Married daughters are in practice
almost totally eliminated,1 2 as are sons-in-law" 3 and aged chil-
dren.1. 4 In no family responsibility statute are brothers and sisters
liable for each other. Thus the class theoretically includes all chil-
dren, but upon closer examination, certain children are seen to be
excluded. Furthermore, relatives of blind indigents are relieved
of all support duties,' 5 whereas relatives of deaf, crippled, and oth-
erwise handicapped indigents are not relieved of support duties.
Thus -the class theoretically includes relatives of all indigents; in
reality it excludes relatives of some indigents.
To reiterate, the second part of the constitutional test requires
that all relatives similarly situated be included in the designated
class. In practice, however, the Pennsylvania statute permits (1)
one relative to be held completely responsible to the exclusion of
other relatives equally able to contribute; (2) some children to be
held liable whereas others are held not liable, despite an equal
financial ability; and (3) all relatives of some indigents to be com-
107. In re Stoner's Estate, 50 Lanc. R. 347 (Pa. C.P. 1947), aff'd, 358
Pa. 225, 56 A.2d 250 (1947).
108. Id.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1963).
110. Commonwealth v. Clayton, 42 Pa. D. & C. 317 (C.P. Del. 1941).
111. Commonwealth v. Capagna, 40 Pa. D. & C. 478 (C.D. Alleg. 1941);
Miller v. Watt, 11 Dist. 439 (Pa. C.P. 1901).
112. Commonwealth v. Brown, 22 D. & C.2d 509 (C.P. Columb. 1962);
Glowsky v. Gitlin, 25 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1941); Gleason v. Boston, 144 Mass. 25,
10 N.E. 476 (1887) (step mother).
113. Id.
114. Commonwealth v. Emerick, 57 Sch. L.R. 106 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(5) (ii) (1967); "notwithstanding any
other provisions of law, no relative shall be required to make monetary or
any other payments or contributions for the support or maintenance of a
blind person ......
pletely excluded from liability, despite their presence within the
statutorily named class and despite their financial ability to pay.
Such distinctions might be justified from a political viewpoint, but
in no manner can they be justified on constitutional grounds. The
classification clearly does not include "all persons similarly situated
in relationship to the indigent."
Pennsylvania's family responsibility statute must be deemed
unconstitutional because its designated class of LRRs does not in-
clude all persons similarly situated in relationship to the indigent.
Coupled with the statute's failure of the first part of the test, a
finding of unconstitutionality becomes doubly apparent.
V. FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
The Pennsylvania Constitution contains no exact parallel to
the federal equal protection clause. There are, however, several
Pennsylvania constitutional provisions which have been employed
by the Pennsylvania courts to arrive at ends similar to those
reached by the federal courts in interpreting the federal equal pro-
tection provision. Chief among these is article 8, section 1 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution:
All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same classes of
subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general
laws.1
8
Initially, the Pennsylvania courts have declared that questions
of uniformity of taxation under this section and denial of equal
protection, as to taxation, under the United States Constitution are
fundamentally the same, and that which would violate one would
violate the other."17 Thus all of the above discussion concerning
violation of the federal equal protection clause by the Pennsylvania
family responsibility statute would apply with equal force in rela-
tion to the uniformity of taxation clause.
The initial question to be considered is whether the family re-
sponsibility statute does indeed impose a "tax" on the LRR. With-
out this, the question will not come within the purview of the uni-
formity clause. Pennsylvania defines tax as being "burdens or
charges imposed by the legislative power upon persons or property
to raise money for public purposes and to defray the necessary ex-
penses of government."" In view of the earlier discussion regard-
ing indigent support as being a proper state function and thus a
116. PA. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
117. In re Pennsylvania Co. for Ins., 345 Pa. 130, 27 A.2d'57 (1942);
Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co. of Pa., 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 370 (C.P.
Dauph. 1965), aff'd, 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965).




public expense, the peculiar monetary imposition of the family re-
sponsibility law would appear to fall by definition, within the
meaning of the word "tax."
. The principle tests for uniformity of taxation employed by the
Pennsylvania courts are: (1) that the classification have a reason-
able basis,119 and (2) that all taxes operate alike on the classes of
things or property subject to it, with substantial equality of tax
burden on all members of the same class.
120
The first requirement, that the classification have a reason-
able basis, is not discernibly different from the federal requirement
that the classification bear a reasonable relationship to its pur-
pose.12' Again, the purpose of the statute is to defray public ex-
penses, and in the words of the Pennsylvania Legislature, "to pro-
mote the welfare and happiness of all of the people of the Common-
wealth."'1 22 Both of these are benefits which inure to the populace
as a whole. The statute creates two classes, one composed of per-
sons who have indigent relatives and are financially able to sup-
port them, and the other consisting of persons who do not have
indigent relatives, or who have such relatives, but are not finan-
cially able to support them. The statute then seeks to compel the
members of the first class to finance a benefit which is intended
to be identical for all members of the populace. It has been seen
that such a classification has no reasonable basis under federal
law.123 Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the same reasoning
applies; no reasonable basis exists for such a classification.
The second Pennsylvania requirement, that all taxes operate
alike on the members of the classes subject to it, is also substan-
tially identical to the federal requirement that the tax fall equally
on all persons standing in a similar relationship to the indigent.
The Pennsylvania statute creates a class consisting of the husband,
wife, child, father, and mother of every indigent, who is finan-
cially capable of supporting the indigent. Under the second Penn-
119. Commonwealth v. Girard Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 558, 158 A. 262 (1932),
affd, 287 U.S. 570 (1933); Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Harrig,
63 Dauph. 205 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
120. Hammermill Paper Co. v. City of Erie, 372 Pa. 85, 92 A.2d 422
(1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953); Commonwealth v. Ripplier Coal
Co., 348 Pa. 372, 35 A.2d 319 (1944); Appeal of Jackson, 56 Lanc. R. 543
(Pa. C.P. 1960), vacated on other grounds, 400 Pa. 473, 262 A.2d 189 (1961).
121. "Though the [federal] test has been variously stated, the end
result is whether the line drawn [in establishing the classification] is a
reasonable one." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 91 (1968).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 401 (1967).
123. See notes 78-115 and accompanying text supra.
sylvania test, the tax must operate alike on all members of this
class to be constitutionally acceptable. Again it should be empha-
sized that the Pennsylvania statute permits (1) one relative to be
held completely liable for support whereas other named relatives,
also financially able, are ignored; 2 4 (2) some children to be held
responsible whereas others are held not liable, despite an equal
financial ability;125 and (3) all relatives of some indigents to be
totally excluded from liability, despite their presence within the
named class and despite their ability to pay.1 26  A statute which
permits such discrepancies in the imposition of a tax clearly does
not "operate alike on all members of the class subject to it.)P
1
27
Pennsylvania's family responsibility statute, it is submitted-in ad-
dition to failing the federal equal protection standard--cannot
withstand the test of the state's own uniformity clause.
VI. FAMILY REsPONSIBILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
The one justification repeatedly raised in support of the fam-
ily responsibility statutes, indeed the moving factor behind the orig-
inal concept, 12 is protection of the public purse.1 2 9 Although as
discussed above, this is not acceptable as a rationale for discrimi-
natory classification, it is ironic that family responsibility statutes
no longer serve even to save money.
In a 1960 study by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, the surprising fact emerged that monies received from con-
tributing relatives outweigh only slightly that spent on the admin-
istrative costs involved in their collection-and these monies re-
ceived included voluntary contributions. 3 0 In 1948, for example,
Maine reinstated family responsibility and enforced it with great
strictness. Maine's annual savings were $800,000,131 or about $1.00
per person.1 3 2 Alabama had a similar experience in 1951, saving
only one million dollars, 3' or about fifty cents per person.114 In
New York and New Jersey, administrative costs were higher than
LRR receipts." 5 A recent California study revealed that three of
four directors of welfare agencies found costs of administration
were higher than receipts in the family responsibility field. 3 6 To
124. See notes 106-115 and accompanying text supra.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
130. SCHARR, supra note 42, at 25-26.
131. Id. at 26.
132. Maine's 1960 population was 913,774. ENCYCL. AMER., VO1. 18, p.
143a (1970).
133. ScuAnn, supra note 42, at 26.
134. Alabama's 1960 population was 2,038,070 (ENCYCL. AmER., vol. 1,
p. 437 (1970).
135. SCHARR, supra note 42 at 25.
136. R. Bond, Our NEEDY AGED, 136 (1954). See atso Rosenbaum, Are
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these figures, of course, must be added the time involved in hearing
and deciding cases in court systems already vastly overcrowded,
and the fact that welfare workers whose skills could more produc-
tively be used elsewhere are forced to spend at least some of their
time researching and prosecuting family responsibility cases, and
all of these factors are multiplied when the responsible relative
is outside the jurisdiction of the state and resort must be made to
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law provisions.
13 7
Although no receipt expenditure figures are available for Penn-
sylvania, it is reasonable to assume that the Pennsylvania situation
is no different from that of the remainder of the nation. In con-
sideration of this fact, it is suggested that the oldest of justifica-
tions for family support statutes-conserving state resources-is
no longer a viable argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania's family responsibility statute cannot be consti-
tutionally justified. Of the reasons advanced as justification for
the classification on which it rests, promotion of the general wel-
fare and protection of the public purse, the first assumes an un-
justifiable denial of the equal protection of the laws, both federal
and state, and the second is constitutionally unacceptable and non-
functional. In addition, the statute acts to defeat its own legisla-
tive intent.
Although this Comment has been limited to a discussion of
Pennsylvania's statute, the discussion is equally applicable to all
family responsibility statutes. The concept of corruption of blood
inherent in such statutes has long been discarded by society. Its
application in the instance of family responsibility has no rational
basis. In light of these considerations, and in the absence of some
overriding state interest served by the family responsibility stat-
utes, it is submitted that all such statutes should be either legisla-
tively repealed 13 or judicially invalidated.
PAUL R. OBER
Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional, 1 FAM. L.Q. 55 (1967); Tully,
Family Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutional Imposition, 5
FAM. L.Q. 32 (1971).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043 (1953).
138. Three states have already taken this step: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-
607 (1955); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4452 (1971); and NEB. REv. ANN. § 68-101
and 102 (1969).
